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The Polish people's revolt is now a year old. 
That, in itself, makes it unusual in attempts to 
develop socialist democracy, for example, in 
Czechoslovakia.
But perhaps the single most important and 
unique aspect of the Polish experience is that 
the momentum for change came from the 
base from the organised working class 
itself. The workers, organised in Solidarity, 
remain the force for change.
In Poland, the working class is officially the 
ruling class. This is consecrated in the 
national constitution and in the Party's 
ideology. But the reality of the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" was, and remains, a 
dictatorship by the Party and the state 
apparatus in the name of the working class. It, 
in fact, became a dictatorship over the 
proletariat.
In 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980. the 
working class (or, in 1968, the students and 
in te l le c tu a ls )  re v o lte d  a g a in s t  th is  
dictatorship, around demands to do with civil 
liberties, prices and food supplies. But in a 
country where strikes were, by definition, 
counter-revolutionary, this became a revolt 
against the political and economic system 
itself.
Workers shot
On two occasions in 1956 and 1970 
the police shot down many workers, 
(iovernment and Party leaders lost their 
official positions, but the system was not 
substantially changed. In 1968 and 1976, the 
movements were crushed and dozens ot 
workers, students and intellectuals jailed.
T he unique aspect of the Polish workers' 
movement is its long history as an 
independent force, and the maturity it 
developed politically and organisationally.
The independent existence and growing 
maturity of the Polish working class 
challenged the rationale of the regime as no 
other force could. In the stalinist period up to 
1956, the apparatus — the bureaucracy — in 
its vast majority believed in its own ideology 
and self-proclaimed historic mission as the 
representative of, or substitute for, the
working class. By the 'seventies, its majority 
was cynical and self-seeking. <
By the time workers staged their successful 
revolt in August 1980. there was widespread 
corruption throughout the apparatus and 
society. The opening of the Polish economy to 
multinational penetration contributed to this 
corruption.
The degeneration also became ideological: 
the anti-semitism of 1966-68 broke with the 
h istoric  trad itio n s  of m arxism . The 
traditional anti-semitism of the Polish people 
was seen as a means of diverting the workers. 
But worse, there was, and remains, a strand in 
the bureaucracy which is itself deeply anti- 
semitic.
The Party-State justified its rule in large 
part by the economic and social advances 
achieved. These rem ained w ithin an 
ideological framework under which socialism 
and then communism would be achieved, 
primarily through economic advance. Thus, 
the question of socialist democracy could be 
marginalised.
In Poland, the Ciierek leadership so 
undermined the basis of economic and social 
advancement that this rationale of the Party- 
State was brought into question.
The economic collapse is most visible in the 
field of food production and supply. Poland is 
agriculturally rich, yet the struggle to find the 
most basic foodstuffs means that workers and 
their families must queue for hours to get 
enough to eat. Some cases of malnutrition 
have even been recorded. After hours of 
patient queueing, workers have so far been 
able to find enough to eat. But, in the coming 
winter, real hunger may appear.
Even more maddening for the Poles is the 
virtual non-existence of other basics: soap, 
detergents, shampoo, cigarettes, matches and 
cooking oil. Alongside this is the flourishing 
black market, fed by the wholesale hijacking 
of food supplies and other essentials. The 
sacking of hundreds of officials for 
corruption (though few have been tried) has 
not allayed the suspicion that corruption
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continues at all levels and worsens the effect 
of the crisis.
Food distribution in Poland has always 
been a problem. Centralised internal trade 
leads to the most irrational shortages and 
then over-supply. The chaos has worsened 
markedly in recent years. Because of its 
immediate impact on workers, the problems 
in the internal distribution system symbolise 
the deficiencies of a centralised bureaucratic 
system on the whole economy. Corruption 
only worsens the inbuilt inefficiency of 
the system.
Nor is it enough to blame all the current ills 
on the previous Gierek government. The 
Kama leadership has had an admittedly 
difficult task balancing the need to respond to 
mass pressures for significant social and 
political reform against the objective 
constraints imposed by Soviet policies. But it 
has now been in power fora yearand workers 
see few significant changes in their economic 
situation yet taking place. Until the inefficient 
centralised bureaucracy's control over the 
economy is removed, and workers themselves 
feel in control of the economy and society, 
nothing substantial can be achieved.
In such a situation, to simply raise prices to 
real levels (an essential part of any economic 
reform) or to cut rations, is a recipe for a 
s o c ia l  e x p lo s io n  w ith  d i s a s t r o u s  
consequences.
The Polish working class is an independent 
force, Por the past year, workers have put 
their faith in Solidarity which is their 
o rg a n isa tio n . B ut, like all m assive 
o rg an isa tio n s, S o lidarity  is open to 
bureaucratisation, thus becoming isolated 
from its base.
Allegiances can change rapidly and people 
can be moved by the dynamics of the 
situation. There is no guarantee that the unity 
which is now expressed in support for 
Solidarity is permanent. It could be shattered 
if Solidarity does not satisfy the workers' 
aspirations and needs.
Given the past, there is no real prospect that 
the workers would then turn to the Party. 
Rather, their frustration could explode into
actions outside the control of Solidarity's 
leadership, risking Polish or Soviet armed 
intervention. Alternatively, demagogues 
who are blindly anti-socialist such as KPN 
(Confederation for Independent Poland), or 
provocateurs from any number of secret 
services, could take control.
That perspective was put to me time and 
again by Solidarity activists and independent 
observers. It is in that framework that we 
must also measure classifications in the 
western media of "moderates" or "centre 
forces , and "radicals" or "extremists".
The Party
Where does the Party the Polish United 
Workers Party (PUWP) stand in this 
dangerous situation?
By August 1980, the credibility of the 
PUWP among the workers had been very 
seriously weakened. The Party is identified 
with serious acts of police repression, 
econom ic m ism anagem ent, censorship , 
widespread corruption and gross inefficiency.
The Party was the State; the State was the 
Party. Even during the last Party Congress, 
Party leaders of all varieties spoke of 
improving relations between the Party and 
"the public". Implicitly, they were talking of 
relations between the rulers and the ruled, 
which corresponds to the reality.
I he Party leadership changed after August 
1980, but the over-riding goal remained: to 
maintain the Party as the ruler of the country 
and to limit as much as possible the powers of 
Solidarity.
The first four months of 1981 were marked 
by the continuing bitter rearguard resistance 
of the Party leadership to Solidarity and its 
legal registration, to Rural Solidarity and to 
the independent students' union.
The Bydgoszcz incident, when police beat 
up Solidarity leaders, represented an attempt 
to control Solidarity as a legal organisation 
by force. After first trying to whitewash the 
incident, the Political Bureau was compelled 
to back down by a virtual uprising among the 
worker members of the Party.
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The revolt of the Party's rank and file held 
the promise of a real renovation of the Party. 
1 he rank and file imposed democratic 
elections for the Extraordinary Party 
Congress. Hundreds of Party officials were 
swept aside. The "horizontal movement" in 
the Party began to organise across the 
country in opposition to the vertically- 
organised Party apparatus.
But the Party apparatus proved too strong. 
It was itself pressured by the Soviet letter of 
June 5 to reassert control over both the 
country and the Party.
Armed with the Soviet letter, applying 
various forms of pressure on those active in 
the horizontal movement, and appealing to 
the heavily-centralised version of "democratic 
centralism", the apparatus banned the 
horizontal movement. It sacked its leader, Z. 
Iwanow, and others, from leading positions, 
and convinced many that the democratic 
reforms in election procedure were enough. 
The horizontal movement disappeared by 
Julv
Congress delegates
The election of delegates to Congress 
resulted in a substantial majority for the 
Kania leadership, together with a vocal and 
confident conservative minority. Most 
delegates were inexperienced in the political 
activity of a Party Congress. They were 
inclined to accept the proposals of the Party 
leadership. But, at the same time, many of 
them reflected the concerns of their fellow 
workers.
Symbolic of this contradiction was an 
impromptu debate in the corridors outside 
the congress hall, broadcast on Polish TV. A 
group of worker delegates spoke out 
militantly before the cameras, saying the 
Party had to be a real workers' party and they 
even supported Solidarity's self-management 
plan. Then, another delegate, an official, 
entered the circle and put the official line: 
discipline, democratic centralism, Marxism- 
Leninism .... Code-words in Poland for the 
status quo.
Within a few moments, those worker
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delegates who had been so outspoken were
nodding in agreement. Then they spoke out in
support of him in almost total contradiction
to what they had said a few minutes before!
The Central Committee elected at the 
Congress reflects the political composition of 
th e  d e le g a te s  a l th o u g h  it has a 
d i s p r o p o r t io n a te  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f 
conservatives. The Political Bureau and the 
Secretariat reflect more the choice of the 
Kania leadership.
The first Central Committee meeting after 
the Congress supported the leadership's 
opposition to Solidarity's proposals for self­
management and economic reform. It is not 
excluded that, in the future, the Central 
Committee and the Party rank and file may 
a c t iv e ly  o p p o s e  th e  l e a d e r s h i p 's  
confrontationist tactics against Solidarity. 
But, for the moment, the reforming 
movement within the Party has been 
contained within the current leadership's 
perspectives and tactics.
Inside S o lidarity , the period  a fte r 
Bydgoszcz has also been a testing one. 
Walesa's unilateral action in calling off the 
strikes protesting against the Bydgoszcz 
incident led to a split with the "radical" 
elements who claim that it was not the 
decision itself they necessarily disagreed with, 
but the way Walesa acted.
Karol Modzelewski, one of the founders of 
the Polish opposition who was linked with 
KOR, resigned as Solidarity's national 
adviser. Solidarity's two vice-presidents, Lis 
and Gwiazda, were on the verge of resigning.
After Bydgoszcz, Solidarity's right to exist 
was firmly established. The focus of 
Solidarity's concern then moved to the 
economic crisis.
The government had placed its proposals 
for economic reform before parliament. The 
"radicals" in Solidarity were dissatisfied. First 
of all, they wanted the workers' councils to 
have the right to elect the factory directors. 
Second, they believed that any economic 
reform would be ineffective if the centralised
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bureaucracy still retained the power to 
arbitrarily intervene in the enterprises.
The discussion on self-management in the 
first half of 1981 was mainly restricted to 
intellectuals and economic specialists. In 
June, Solidarity branches in the country's 18 
biggest factories met and decided to take up 
the demand of full self-management. These 
big 18 factories formed an informal "network" 
which sponsored a counter draft law on self­
management and a series of conferences on 
the subject.
When a conference was called in Gdansk in 
early July, over 1,000 workplaces and 
factories sent delegates and endorsed this 
counter draft which, first of all, gave workers' 
councils the right to elect directors and, 
second, gave economic freedom within a 
market mechanism.
At the Party Congress, the counter draft 
law was the subject of a major attack. It was 
described as "anti-socialist", "restoring 
capitalism", and so on.
After the Congress, and after the 
government unilaterally cut rations and 
raised prices, the q uestion  of self­
management became the key political issue.
Lech Walesa
Walesa and those supporting him had 
propagated the idea that Solidarity should be 
simply a trade union in the traditional sense, 
leaving economic management to the 
government. But the dangers of such a 
concept, which allows strikes as well as 
compromise, clearly emerged in the explosion 
of anger against the price rises and ration cuts.
Within a few weeks, Walesa became an 
exponent of full self-management. Solidarity 
will therefore hold its first national congress 
in early September backing self-management.
Walesa's change of position was also 
dictated by two other factors: first, the 
hardline government opposition expressed in 
its use of the media against Solidarity and, 
second, a survey which showed one-third of 
Solidarity members already disillusioned 
with what the organisation had achieved.
With the workers' anger tinder-dry, the 
smallest spark could lead to riots and chaos. 
In such a situation, the "irresponsible" people 
were those who took a simple trade union 
line.
The decline of the Church's influence inside 
Solidarity was another factor which changed 
the situation. The Church, before August 
1980 the sole organisation independent of the 
Party and State, had been able to reinforce its 
traditional role in Poland as a focus for 
national identity. The Church became 
unhappy when Solidarity developed as a 
second and attractive independent force. It 
tried to take Solidarity under its wing through 
the influence it exerted over Walesa.
The Church hierarchy is a conservative 
social force: it certainly has no enthusiasm for 
full workers' self-management. Its lack of 
e n th u s ia s m  is s h a re d  by W e ste rn  
governments and media.
The "radicals" recently felt strong enough 
to campaign against Church influence in 
Solidarity. They published in Solidarity 
Weekly an article asking "Is the Church trying 
to  ta k e  o v e r S o lid a r i ty ? "  W alesa  
acknowledged that both the Church and the 
Party had, indeed, tried to "take over" 
Solidarity, but that he had always insisted on 
its independence as a self-governing workers' 
organisation.
Inside Solidarity, the balance has therefore 
shifted towards a decisive struggle for full self­
management and a thorough economic 
reform. Only when the government agrees 
will Solidarity feel able to try to persuade the 
workers to accept price restructuring and 
other necessary sacrifices everyone will have 
to make.
Even if there is full self-management and a 
drastic cutback in the powers of the 
centralised bureaucracy, there will be at least 
four or five years of hardship ahead of the 
Polish people. The food shortages cannot be 
overcome overnight. Farmers must be gi\en 
real freedom from bureaucratic control, and 
priority in supply of machinery. But even with 
that, and a fair payment for what they 
produce, farmers will continue to be
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dissatisfied with the few consumer goods 
available to them.
Rural Solidarity has a key role to play in 
the coming period. In return for a genuine 
reform, it has to persuade farmers to produce 
as much as possible even if the real incentive 
to do so is limited by the reality.
How will the Soviet Union react to a 
genuine economic reform, including self­
management? Is the Party leadership taking a 
hard line on these issues because it fears the 
Soviet Union will intervene militarily, at 
whatever cost, to stop such deep-going 
reforms?
No one really knows if this interpretation is 
correct. In any case, the centralised 
bureaucracy has its own interests to defend 
when it comes to self-management.
Any analysis which regards Soviet pressure 
as the central issue, and therefore imagines 
that a neat solution is acceptance of the 
government plan for limited economic reform 
and freezing the situation as it is, ignores the 
reality. The workers are an independent, 
volatile force. The situation is not one where 
you can expect the workers to passively 
accept any imposed solution.
If the situation were frozen, then the 
dangers of a spontaneous, uncontrolled 
explosion, demagogy and provocation are 
enormous. The dangers would grow as the 
economic crisis worsened and further Soviet 
intervention, perhaps including armed force, 
would be inevitable.
The implications of the Polish experience 
for Australian socialists is beyond the scope 
of this article. Yet, clearly, it demands as 
much consideration as did the Czechoslovak 
events in 1968. After 1968, the CPA and many 
other communist parties in Europe and 
elsewhere, re-evaluated their conception of 
the sort of socialist society they were fighting 
for.
The CPA adopted the model of self­
management, extended to the whole of 
society, combined with a multi-party political 
system, independent trade unions and fuller 
civil liberties than exist in the most advanced 
capitalist democracy. As a model, it is good.
Now we see in Poland that such a model is, 
within the framework of Poland's "geo­
political reality", at the centre of the workers' 
demands. When a model becomes reality it 
can be a shock: the Party is often being led, 
not leading; the Church plays a role; many 
workers identifying communism with what 
existed in Poland are "anti-communist"; 
rightist, anarchist and other ideas are 
expressed.
This model upsets schemas which somehow 
see a socialist democracy in which the Party 
would still make the basic decisions and 
e v e ry b o d y  o u ts id e  it w o u ld  bow  
spontaneously before the Party's greater 
wisdom.
Socialist democracy certainly won't be like 
th a t ;  P o lan d  is a liv ing  ex am p le . 
Contradictory social forces will confront each 
o th e r . T here  are m any u n ex p lo re d  
implications for socialists that require a more 
thorough analysis of what we mean by 
socialist democracy and self-management.
The need for a more detailed analysis of the 
"socialist countries" also arises from Polish 
events. The nationalised economic base 
certainly remains an historic achievement. In 
Poland, it means that no one talks of handing 
the factories over to the old or any new 
capitalists, but rather of putting these 
factories under workers' self-management.
Poland has again posed that a nationalised 
economy may not be enough to allow us to 
describe such countries as "socialist" or even 
"socialist-based".
The credibility of communism and even of 
socialism in the capitalist world, above all in 
the advanced capitalist countries, depends in 
large part, on a joint effort by all marxists to 
develop such an analysis. That task has 
already begun, but it still has a long way to go.
